At the beginning of the dialogue Socrates insists on a conversation instead of giving speeches
At the beginning of the dialogue Socrates insists on a conversation instead of giving speeches
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates insists on a “conversation” instead of giving speeches.
Do he and Gorgias truly have a conversation?
Why does Socrates insist on short answers?
Does this help or hinder the debate over the nature of rhetoric?
Script:
GORGIAS: Here’s your opportunity to find out, Chaerephon.
POLUS: I honestly think you should put your questions to me, Chaerephon, if you don’t mind. I get the impression that Gorgias is tired. He’s just finished a long teaching session.
CHAEREPHON: Do you really think you’ll give me better answers than Gorgias, Polus?
POLUS: What’s the difference, as long as they’re good enough for you? b
CRAEREPHON: None at all. Here’s my question, then, since that’s what you want.
POLUS: Go on.
CHAEREPHON: All right. If Gorgias happened to be in the same line of business as his brother Herodicus, we’d have to call him the same as we call his brother, wouldn’t we?
POLUS: Yes.
CHAEREPHON: In other words, we’d have to call him a doctor.
POLUS: Yes.
CHAEREPHON: And if his professional experience was in the same field as Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or his brother, what would it be right to call him?
POLUS: A painter, obviously.
CHAEREPHON: What is his area of expertise, in actual fact? What would it be right to call him?
POLUS: Chaerephon, experience and experimentation have led people to develop professional expertise in a number of areas. Experience brings expertise to the process of human existence, while inexperience leaves it haphazard. Now, there are various areas of expertise, variously practised by various people, but the best are in the hands of the best practitioners. Gorgias here is one of them, and the area of expertise in which he is engaged is the finest there is.*
SOCRATES: It certainly looks as though Polus is well d qualified to speak, Gorgias, but he’s not doing what he promised Chaerephon he’d do.
GORGIAS: Why’s that, Socrates?
SOCRATES: He doesn’t really seem to me to be answering the question.
GORGIAS: Why don’t you question him, then, if you want?
SOCRATES: I don’t want to if there’s a chance that you might be willing to answer my questions. I’d much rather ask you. I mean, I can tell from Polus’ speech that he’s more interested in rhetoric, as it’s called, than in carrying on a conversation.
POLUS: What gives you that impression, Socrates? e
SOCRATES: Because when Chaerephon asks you what Gorgias’ area of expertise is, Polus, you come out with a eulogy of it–as if someone had been running it down–instead of telling us what it is.
POLUS: But didn’t I say that it’s the finest area of expertise there is?
SOCRATES: You certainly did, but no one asked you what qualities Gorgias’ area of expertise has. The question was what it is, and what Giorgias should be called. You gave excellent, concise answers to the questions Chaerephon had previously put to you, so couldn’t you do the same now, and tell us what 449a Gorgias’ area of expertise is and what we should call him? Or rather, Gorgias, won’t you tell us yourself what your area of expertise is, and so what to call you?
GORGIAS: It’s rhetoric, Socrates.
SOCRATES: We’d better call you a rhetorician, then?
GORGIAS: A good one, Socrates, if you want to call me what (as Homer puts it) ‘I avow I am.’*
SOCRATES: I’ll gladly do so.
GORGIAS: Then that’s what you can call me.
SOCRATES: What about training other people in rhetoric b too? Should we attribute this ability to you? GORGIAS: Yes, that’s what I offer to do, here in Athens and elsewhere as well.
SOCRATES: Now, would you mind if our discussion continued the way it’s begun, Gorgias, with you asking a question here and answering one there? Would it be all right with you if we postponed the kind of lengthy speech-making which Polus introduced? Please keep your promise and give short answers to questions.
GORGIAS: Some questions need long speeches to answer them, Socrates, but all the same I’ll try to keep my answers as short as possible. In fact, that’s another c of my claims–that no one can find a more concise way to express an idea than me.
SOCRATES: That’s what we need, Gorgias. A display of precision is exactly what I’d like from you, and longwindedness can wait.
GORGIAS: All right. I’ll leave you in no doubt that what you’re hearing is as precise as it gets. Socrates asks what Gorgias’ area of expertise, rhetoric, is concerned with. Gorgias says ‘speech’, but Socrates argues, first, that all areas of expertise are concerned to some extent with speaking, and, second, that a number of other areas of expertise are as essentially concerned with speech as rhetoric is. Gorgias’ first attempt at defining rhetoric fails because it is too wide. The Greek for ‘spoken word’ (logos) is also the Greek for ‘written word’, but a modern reader should bear in mind that for the Greeks speech was far more primary than it is for us today. Logos also means ‘account’, ‘argument, ‘definition’, and ‘rational explanation’ (as distinct from a story); all these translations will occur in the course of the dialogue.
SOCRATES: Here we go, then. Now, you describe yourself as an expert in rhetoric and you also claim to pass it on to other people too. But what aspect of life d is rhetoric concerned with? The province of weaving, for instance, is the manufacture of clothes, wouldn’t you say?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of tunes? GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: I’m really impressed with your answers, Gorgias. I can’t imagine how they could be shorter. GORGIAS: Yes, I think I’m doing pretty well, Socrates.
SOCRATES: You’re right. Now then, I’d like to hear what you have to say in the same vein about rhetoric as well. What aspect of life does it know about?
GORGIAS: Speaking. e
SOCRATES: In what sense, Gorgias? Do you mean explaining to people when they’re ill what regimen to follow to get better?
GORGIAS: No.
SOCRATES: In that case, rhetoric isn’t concerned with all speech.
GORGIAS: No, of course not.
SOCRATES: But it does make people competent at speaking.
GORGIAS: Yes. S
OCRATES: And also at understanding what they’re speaking about?
GORGIAS: Naturally.
SOCRATES: Now, isn’t it expertise in medicine, which we referred to a moment ago, which makes one com- 450a petent at understanding and speaking about people who are ill?
GORGIAS: Of course.
SOCRATES: So it seems to follow that medicine is concerned with speaking too.*
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: With speaking about illness, anyway. Yes?
GORGIAS: Definitely.
SOCRATES: Would you say, then, that physical education is also concerned with speaking–with speaking about physical fitness and unfitness?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same goes for every other area of expertise as well, Gorgias. Every single one of them is concerned with speech, when the matter being b talked about happens to be the one which is the province of its particular expertise. GORGIAS: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: Given that you’re defining rhetoric as the area of expertise which is concerned with speech, then, why don’t you describe any form of expertise as rhetoric, since expertise and speaking always go together?
GORGIAS: Because the knowledge which other areas of expertise possess is more or less entirely confined to manual work and that kind of activity, whereas there is no element of manual work in rhetoric. It relies entirely on the spoken word in performing its task and achieving its results. That’s why I maintain that c the province of rhetoric is speech, and–as I say–I think I’m right.
SOCRATES: I’m not sure I understand what you’re trying to say about rhetoric, but perhaps it’ll become clear later. Here’s a question for you, though. We’ve got these areas of expertise, right?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, some of them are largely taken up with practical activity and have little need of speaking. In fact, some of them don’t need the spoken word at all: even complete silence wouldn’t stop them accomplishing whatever it is their expertise is for. I’m thinking here of painting, sculpture, and so on and so forth. I suppose these are the kinds of areas of expertise you were talking about when you said that there are some which rhetoric bears no relation to. d Or am I wrong?
GORGIAS: No, you’re quite right, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then there are other areas of expertise which rely entirely on speech for their accomplishments. In these cases it’s hardly an exaggeration to say that practical action isn’t important to them at all, or isn’t particularly important. I’m thinking of mathematics, for instance, and arithmetic and geometry-not forgetting backgammon*–and there are plenty of others as well. Some of them give more or less equal weight to words and action, but most of them favour words and in general rely exclusively on them in performing their tasks and achieving their results. e These are the kinds of areas of expertise among which you’re counting rhetoric, I take it.
GORGIAS: You’re right.
SOCRATES: But I’m sure you wouldn’t want actually to identify rhetoric with any of them. I know that’s what it sounded as though you were saying, when you defined rhetoric as the area of expertise which relies on speech to achieve its results, and if someone wanted to pick a quarrel he might take you up on this point and say, ‘So you’re identifying rhetoric with mathematics, are you, Gorgias?’ But I’m sure you’re not actually identifying rhetoric with mathematics or geometry.
GORGIAS: You’re right, Socrates. You’ve correctly inter- 451a preted my meaning. Socrates suggests that Gorgias can retain his description of rhetoric, but should narrow it down by pinpointing its particular domain or subject-matter. Gorgias replies grandiosely that rhetoric is concerned with the most important aspects of human life, by which he turns out to mean politics. Rhetoric is the art of persuading others to do what you want them to do, especially in the political arena. Socrates continues to prod Gorgias until he narrows the sphere of rhetoric down further, to morality, and then further still to: ‘Rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce conviction, but not to educate people, about matters of right and wrong.’
SOCRATES: All right, then, please will you finish answering my question yourself, in the terms in which I asked it. Given that rhetoric is one of those areas of expertise which rely heavily on the spoken word, but that there are in fact others which fit this description too, please try to tell us what the particular province is in which rhetoric achieves its results by means of speech. Here’s an example. Imagine someone taking me up on one of the areas of expertise I mentioned a moment ago and asking, ‘What is mathematics, Socrates?’ b ‘It’s one of the areas of expertise which rely on words to achieve their results,’ I’d tell him, copying the reply you gave us a short while ago. ‘But what is it concerned with?’ he’d go on to ask. ‘Odd and even numbers of any quantity,’ I’d answer. ‘And what do you call arithmetic?’ he’d ask next. ‘That’s another area of expertise which relies on words to achieve its results,’ I’d say. ‘And what does it deal with?’ he’d continue. My reply would sound like a political statute: ‘Whereas in some respects arithmetic resembles c mathematics–in that they are both concerned with odd and even numbers– nevertheless there is this difference between them, that arithmetic investigates the quantitative relationships that odd and even numbers form between themselves and one another.’ And suppose it was astronomy which was the subject of his next question, and I described it as another area of expertise which relies on words for all its results. And suppose he asked, ‘But what are astronomers’ words about, Socrates?’, I’d reply, ‘They’re concerned with the movements of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies, and their relative speeds.’ GEORGIAS: And you’d be right, Socrates. d
SOCRATES: All right, Gorgias, it’s your turn. Rhetoric is one of those areas of expertise which rely on the spoken word for all their accomplishments and achievements. Yes? GEORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Please tell us, then, what its province is. What aspect of life is the rhetorical use of the spoken word concerned with?
GEORGIAS: The most important and valuable aspect of human life, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Now, here’s another idea of yours, Gorgias, which is open to question and in need of a great deal of clarification. For instance, I’m sure you’ve heard e the song people sing at parties which offers a list of human advantages: ‘The very best thing is health, second good looks, and third’–according to whoever made up the song–‘honest wealth.’*
GORGIAS: Yes, I have. But why are you bringing it up?
SOCRATES: Well, suppose a doctor, a trainer, and a busi- 452a nessman–who are the people responsible for the qualities the song-writer commended–were standing right there next to you. And suppose the doctor went first and said, ‘Socrates, Gorgias ‘isn’t telling you the truth. The greatest of human blessings isn’t covered by his area of expertise, but by mine.’ ‘You say it’s your province,’ I’d reply, ‘but what are you?’ ‘I’m a doctor,’ he’d presumably answer. ‘What do you mean? Is your area of expertise responsible for the greatest of human blessings?’ ‘Of course, Socrates,’ he’d probably reply, ‘because its product is health. And what could be better for people than health?’ b And imagine the trainer going next and saying, ‘Listen, Socrates, if Gorgias can show you that the product of his area of expertise is more beneficial for people than I can show mine to be, I’d share the doctor’s surprise.’ I’d ask him the same question as before: ‘Who are you, sir? What’s your job?’ ‘I’m a trainer,’ he’d reply, ‘and my job is making people’s bodies attractive and fit.’ And then it would be the businessman’s turn to speak, and I see his attitude as one of total disdain. ‘I want you to consider, Socrates,’ he’d say, ‘whether you really think that anything which Gorgias or anyone else can procure is more beneficial than wealth.’ c ‘What?’ we’d say. ‘Is wealth yours to produce?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘What are you, then?’ ‘A businessman.’ ‘And in your opinion people can have no greater advantage than wealth?’ we’ll ask. ‘Of course they can’t,’ he’ll reply. ‘But Gorgias here doesn’t agree,’ we’d point out. ‘He claims that his area of expertise is responsible for something which is more beneficial than anything yours can produce.’ And the businessman’s next question will obviously be: ‘What is this wonderful thing? Gorgias had better tell us.’ d So, Gorgias, please add their imagined request to mine, and tell us what this thing is which is the greatest blessing people can have, according to you, and which you can procure for them.
GORGIAS: When I say there’s nothing better, Socrates, that is no more than the truth. It is responsible for personal freedom and enables an individual to gain political power in his community.
SOCRATES: Yes, but what is it?
GORGIAS: I’m talking about the ability to use the spoken e word to persuade–to persuade the jurors in the courts, the members of the Council, the citizens attending the Assembly*–in short, to win over any and every form of public meeting of the citizen body. Armed with this ability, in fact, the doctor would be your slave, the trainer would be yours to command, and that businessman would turn out to be making money not for himself, but for someone else–for you with your ability to speak and to persuade the masses. SOCRATES: Gorgias, I think you’ve finally come very close to revealing what you think rhetoric does. If I’ve 453a understood you correctly, you’re saying that rhetoric is the agent of persuasion– that persuasion is the sum total and the fundamental goal of all its activity. Is that right? Or do you want to claim that rhetoric has further abilities, apart from winning over the minds of an audience?
GORGIAS: No, Socrates, I don’t. I think you’ve described it well enough. That is fundamentally what rhetoric does.
SOCRATES: Well, I’ve got something to tell you, Gorgias. You should be aware that I’m a prime example–or so I’m persuaded–of the type of person who en- b gages in conversation purely because he wants to understand the topic under discussion. I’m like that myself, I believe, and I hope you are too. GORGIAS: Why, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I’ll tell you straight away. The point is, you see, that I don’t fully understand what this rhetoric based persuasion you’re talking about is, and what it is persuasion about. This is not to say that I don’t at least have a vague idea of what you mean it to be, and what its sphere of operation is, but all the same I’m going to ask you to explain what this rhetoric based persuasion is and what its province is. You c may wonder why I’m asking you for an explanation, and not stating my own view of the matter, however vague that may be. It doesn’t actually have anything to do with you; I just want the course of the discussion to show us as clearly as possible what it is we’re talking about. I think you’ll agree that it’s fair for me to question you if you look at it this way. Suppose my question had actually been what sort of painter Zeuxis is, and you’d replied that he paints figures, wouldn’t it be fair for me to have asked you what kinds of figures he paints, and where his work can be seen? GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And it would be fair because there are other d painters who paint a wide variety of different kinds of figures? GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Whereas if Zeuxis were the only painter in the world, your answer would have been fine. Yes? GORGIAS: Of course.
SOCRATES: All right. Now, what about rhetoric? Is rhetoric the only area of expertise whose product is persuasion, do you think, or are there others too? Here’s what I’m getting at. Is it or isn’t it the case that any teacher of any subject persuades his students of what he’s trying to get them to understand?
GORGIAS: Of course he does, Socrates. Persuasion is essential to teaching.
SOCRATES: Let’s have another look, in this context, at e the same areas of expertise we were talking about a short while ago. Doesn’t mathematics teach us the properties of number? Isn’t that what a mathematician does?
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And doesn’t he persuade us about them as well?
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: It follows that mathematics is another agent of persuasion. GORGIAS: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: Now, if we were asked what kind of persuasion it is an agent of, and what it is persuasive about, we’d presumably answer that it is an agent of educational persuasion, and that its province is odd and even numbers and their quantities. And we could do 454a the same for all the other areas of expertise we mentioned a short while ago–we could show not just that they are agents of persuasion, but also what particular kind of persuasion they are agents of, and what their spheres of operation are. Do you agree? GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: So rhetoric isn’t the only agent of persuasion.
GORGIAS: You’re right.
SOCRATES: Well, given that other areas of expertise produce the same result and rhetoric isn’t an isolated case, wouldn’t it be fair for us next to ask the same question we asked about Zeuxis and his painting? Faced with the claim that rhetoric is an agent of persuasion, we should ask, ‘Yes, but what kind of persuasion does rhetoric produce, and what is its sphere of operation?’ Don’t you think that’s a fair question? b
GORGIAS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: In that case, Gorgias, please will you answer it? GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I think–to repeat what I was saying not long ago–that its effect is to persuade people in the kinds of mass meetings which happen in lawcourts and so on; and I think its province is right and wrong.
SOCRATES: Actually, you’ve exactly confirmed my suspicions, Gorgias, about the sort of persuasion you meant and its province as well. Now, I hope you won’t be surprised if a little later I ask you the same kind of question again–the kind of question which asks for further clarification, when something seems to be clear already. As I say, there’s nothing personal in these c questions; they’re only meant to let the discussion proceed in due order, and to stop us getting into the habit of pre-empting the other person’s meaning as a result of having half-formed ideas about it. I just want you to be able to develop your own views–in keeping with whatever you had in mind at the outset–in your own preferred way.
GORGIAS: I certainly can’t see anything wrong with that, Socrates.
SOCRATES: All right, then. Here’s something else for us to think about. You do recognize that there are situations when we say ‘I’ve been taught’, don’t you? GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And also when we say ‘I’m convinced’? GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Now, do you think that the state of having d been taught something is the same as the state of having been convinced? Is learning the same as conviction, or different?
GORGIAS: In my opinion, Socrates, they’re different.
SOCRATES: Yes, you’re right, and here’s the proof of it. If you were asked, ‘ Gorgias, can conviction be either true or false?’, you’d answer yes, I’m sure.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But can knowledge be either true or false? GORGIAS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Obviously, then, conviction and knowledge aren’t the same.
GORGIAS: Right.
SOCRATES: All the same, it isn’t only people who’ve e learned something who have been persuaded of it; people who’ve been convinced of something have as well. GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES: So we’d better think in terms of two kinds of persuasion, one of which confers conviction without understanding, while the other confers knowledge.
GORGIAS: All right.
SOCRATES: Which of these two kinds of persuasion, then, in the province of right and wrong, is the effect rhetoric has on people when they’re assembled in lawcourts and so on? Is it the kind which leads to conviction without understanding, or the kind which leads to understanding? GORGIAS: The answer’s obvious,
Socrates: it’s the kind that leads to conviction.
SOCRATES: It turns out, then, that rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce 455a conviction, but not to educate people, about matters of right and wrong.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: A rhetorician, then, isn’t concerned to educate the people assembled in lawcourts and so on about right and wrong; all he wants to do is persuade them. I mean, I shouldn’t think it’s possible for him to get so many people to understand such important matters in such a short time.
GORGIAS: No, that’s right. Against the background of this definition of rhetoric, Socrates argues that it is of limited value. Most aspects of life are covered by specialists, to whom we turn when we need advice. Gorgias acknowledges the role of specialists, but replies that rhetoric influences events and then hands them over to the various specialists. A rhetorician could even persuade people that he was a specialist of some kind, when he wasn’t. However, Gorgias quickly explains that he’s not recommending this kind of abuse of the immense power of rhetoric and concludes that when that happens one should blame the practitioner, not people like himself, who merely teach rhetoric.
SOCRATES: Come on, then, let’s see what it is we’re actually saying about rhetoric. You see, I have to tell b you that I can’t ye: make up my mind what to think about it. When there’s a public meeting in Athens to elect a doctor or a shipwright or any other professional, the purpose of the meeting is obviously to choose the person with the greatest expertise for each post, so it’s not going to be a rhetorician who advises them under these circumstances, is it? They’re not going to use rhetoricians to advise them when there are fortifications to be built or harbours or dockyards to be constructed: they’ll use master builders. Again, they’re not going to use rhetoricians to advise them on who to elect to military command or on troop movements in combat or on capturing enemy territory: it’ll be military experts who advise them c under these circumstances, not rhetoricians.* What are your thoughts about this, Gorgias? I mean, you’re a rhetorician, you say, and you train others to be rhetoricians too, so it would be good to hear what you have to say about your own area of expertise. You should bear in mind our present situation and realize that I have your best interests at heart. It’s quite possible that there are people here in the house with us who’d like to become students of yours . . . yes, I can see a few candidates–well, quite a lot, in fact. They might be too embarrassed to subject you to questioning, so as I put my questions, you should imagine that it’s actually they who are asking d you, ‘What will attending your courses hold for us, Gorgias? What will we be able to advise Athens on? Only matters of right and wrong, or the subjects Socrates mentioned just now as well?’ What do you have to say in reply?
GORGIAS: All right, Socrates. I’ll do my best to demonstrate what rhetoric is capable of doing and leave nothing unclear. You cued me in perfectly yourself. I mean, I assume you’re aware that it was either Themistocles or Pericles, not the professionals, whose e advice led to those dockyards you mentioned, and to Athens’ fortifications and the construction of the harbours.
SOCRATES: Yes, Gorgias. I only have it on hearsay about Themistocles, but I was there in person when Pericles advised us to build the Middle Wall.*
GORGIAS: And you can see, Socrates, that whenever 456a there’s a decision to be made about any of the matters you mentioned just now, it’s the rhetoricians whose suggestions are heard and whose opinions prevail.
SOCRATES: I find that incredible, Gorgias, and that’s why I’ve been asking you all this time what rhetoric is capable of. Faced with phenomena like the one you’ve mentioned, it comes across as something supernatural, with enormous power.
GORGIAS: You don’t know the half of it, Socrates! Almost every accomplishment falls within the scope of rhetoric. I’ve got good evidence of this. Often in the b past, when I’ve gone with my brother or some other doctor to one of their patients who was refusing to take his medicine or to let the doctor operate on him or cauterize him, the doctor proved incapable of persuading the patient to accept his treatment, but I succeeded, even though I didn’t have any other expertise to draw on except rhetoric. Think of a community–any community you like–and I assure you that if an expert in rhetoric and a doctor went there and had to compete against each other for election as that community’s doctor by addressing the Assembly or some other public meeting, the doctor would be left standing, and the effective speaker would win the c election, if that’s what he wanted. In fact, it doesn’t matter what his rival’s profession is: the rhetorician would persuade them to choose him, and the other person would fail. It’s inconceivable that a professional of any stamp could speak more persuasively in front of a crowd than a rhetorician on any topic at all. So you can see how effective rhetoric is, and the kinds of things it’s capable of doing. All the same, it should be used just as one would any other competitive skill. The fact that a person has trained as a boxer or a pancratiast* or a soldier, and can con- d sequently defeat friends and enemies alike, doesn’t mean he has to use this skill of his against everyone indiscriminately; it doesn’t give him a reason to go around beating his friends up or stabbing them to death! Moreover, if someone goes to a gym, gets fit, and learns how to box, and then beats up his parents or some other friend or relation of his, this is certainly no reason for people to bear a grudge against trainers and people who teach others how to fight in armour, e and ban them from their communities. A teacher passes his expertise on for his pupils to use when it is morally appropriate to do so–which is to say, defensively, not aggressively, and against people who wish them harm and do them wrong. It is the pupils who corrupt and abuse their strength and their skills. 457a This doesn’t mean that the teachers are bad, and it doesn’t mean that the expertise is at fault or is bad either; it only reflects on those who abuse it, surely. The same goes for rhetoric. A rhetorician is capable of speaking effectively against all comers, whatever the issue, and can consequently be more persuasive in front of crowds about–to cut a long story short–anything he likes. Nevertheless, the fact b that he’s capable of getting people to think less highly of doctors and their fellow professionals doesn’t mean that he has to do so. Just like any competitive skill, rhetoric should be used when morally appropriate. If a person becomes good at rhetoric and then uses the power this expertise brings to do wrong, surely people shouldn’t bear a grudge against the teacher and ban him from their communities. He passed his expertise on for moral usage, and it’s this pupil of c his who’s using it for the opposite reasons. Hostility, banishment, and execution may be fair responses to abuse of rhetoric, but it’s unfair to treat the teacher like that. Before beginning to criticize what Gorgias has said about rhetoric, Socrates delivers a pointed warning against taking such arguments personally. SOCRATES: There’s a particular phenomenon that crops up during discussions, Gorgias, and you’ve experienced so many of them, like me, that I’m sure you’ve noticed it. People find it difficult to agree on exactly what it is they’re trying to talk about, and this makes it hard for them to learn from one another and so bring their conversations to a mutually satisfactory conclusion. What happens instead, when two people d are arguing about something, is that one person tells the other that he’s wrong or has expressed himself obscurely, and then they get angry and each thinks that his own point of view is being maliciously misinterpreted by the other person, and they start trying to win the argument rather than look into the issue they set out to discuss. Sometimes the argument finally breaks up in an appalling state, with people hurling abuse and saying the kinds of things to each other which can only make the bystanders cross at themselves for having thought these people worth
